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1 Introduction
Partnerships fail. Marriages break down, friendships rupture, your gym buddy stops
training. When partnerships break down, new partnerships are forged in the aftermath,
until an equilibrium, or something close to an equilibrium, is again reached. The reasons
that partnerships can break down are many: often human imperfection and the vicissi-
tudes of fate play a role. Errors, mishaps or misbehavior on the part of one of the partners
can contribute to the decline of a partnership. However, partnerships are not all alike.
Some partnerships are strong, some are weak. Some partnerships are easily substitutable,
others less so. It is not just the partnerships themselves that can be more or less robust.
Due to the interrelationship of different partnerships, networks of partnerships also dis-
play robustness characteristics which depend on the robustness of their constituent pair-
ings. This paper analyses such settings in the context of the well known marriage prob-
lem of Gale and Shapley (1962) as described in Jackson and Watts (2002). We show that
for standard matching dynamics, perturbed by an error process, any stochastically stable
matching is contained in the class of matchings which are most robust to one-shot devia-
tion. For the logit choice rule, this class corresponds to an NTU version of the least-core as
described in Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1979). The results extend to one-sided match-
ing markets (roommate problems) and to many-to-one matchings (college admissions
problems). We apply our results to search for conditions on preferences which ensure
stochastic stability of the preferred stable matching of one side of a two sided market.
In the related papers of Jackson and Watts (2002) and Klaus, Klijn and Walzl (2010),
players occasionally make mistakes in a dynamic model of partnership formation. Mis-
takes involve a player leaving an existing partner or matching with a new partner in such
a way that his payoff is reduced. A single mistake can be fatal to a partnership and can
drive the dynamic process of partnership formation to a new equilibrium, from which in
turn a single mistake can take the process elsewhere. The process can in this way move
from any equilibrium to any other equilibrium. In the language of Noldeke and Samuel-
son (1993), all the equilibria are part of a single mutation connected component. This fact
means that all of the stable partnership networks in their setting are stochastically stable in
the sense of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993); Young (1993). When mistakes are rare, in
the long run the process will spend almost all of its time at stochastically stable matchings.
It should be remembered that one of the strengths of stochastic stability as imple-
mented by Young (1993), as opposed to, for example, asymptotic stability or evolutionary
stable strategies, is that stochastic stability can measure the resilience of equilibria to mul-
tiple shocks. This makes transitions between equilibria depend on cardinal payoffs, rather
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than just ordinal payoffs. Another way of inducing such a dependence is to make error
probabilities directly dependent on payoffs, such as in the logit choice model (Blume,
1993). We take the latter approach, although similar results can be derived by allowing
the history of a partnership to change gradually in response to shocks.
Jackson and Watts (2002) give payoffs as cardinal, although their perturbed dynamic
process is not sensitive enough for results to depend on the magnitude of payoff differ-
ences. Klaus et al. (2010) features the more standard set up of ordinal preferences. Due to
differing strengths of partnerships, the authors of the current paper believe cardinal pref-
erences to be a natural assumption in matching models. Moreover, abstraction away from
cardinal preferences, or the choice of a dynamic which is insensitive to such preferences,
is not without loss when it comes to applying a concept such as stochastic stability.1
In the model of this paper, it is no longer the case that all stable matchings are stochas-
tically stable, as they are in the models of Jackson and Watts (2002) and Klaus et al. (2010).
Rather, the identity of stochastically stable states can depend on the payoffs of individual
players. In dynamic processes with mistakes, any mistake by a player or pair of players
has a cost, which can be interpreted as a measure of how bad the mistake is for those
committing it. Mistakes with higher cost occur less often. We show that most of the time
we can restrict attention to the least costly deviation from any stable matching, which for
the logit choice rule equates to the deviation causing the lowest payoff loss to the devi-
ating players. The stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained within the
set of matchings with the highest cost least cost deviations. This result extends to room-
mate problems with nonempty core and to college admissions problems with responsive
preferences.
There is a growing literature which looks at equilibrium selection in matching prob-
lems (Biro´ and Norman, 2012; Boudreau, 2012; Echenique and Yariv, 2012; Pais, Pinter
and Veszteg, 2012). Typically, these papers use simulation or experimental evidence to
generate a distribution over absorbing states reached by a dynamic process without mis-
takes, conditional on the process being started at some initial matching. In contrast to
these papers, our results are independent of the initial matching and the probabilities
with which any players are chosen to better respond. Moreover, the results in the current
paper are analytical.2 The papers cited above consider short run behavior given some
1It is not uncommon to assume cardinal preferences in the literature on matching problems. Abdulka-
dirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda (2011) discuss that a mechanism sensitive to cardinal preferences may achieve
a Pareto-superior matching to one obtained by the deferred acceptance mechanism of Gale and Shapley
(1962).
2Boudreau (2011) writes of the prior approach: “Calculating the probability of each stable outcome for a given
market under the randomized taˆtonnement process is extremely difficult due to the tremendous number of paths that
can be involved. . . Loops in the process mean that a closed form solution is virtually impossible to obtain.”
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initial condition. In contrast, the current paper models the long run.
Algorithms for implementing a stable matching often select a matching which is op-
timal for one side of the market. This is true, for example, for hospital-intern matching
in the United States (Roth, 1984; Roth and Peranson, 1999). A natural goal is then to find
conditions under which such a matching is stochastically stable. Transitions between sta-
ble matchings are usually driven by the errors of players who are relatively insensitive
to differences between prospective partners. If men are highly payoff insensitive relative
to women, then, under the logic choice rule, easiest possible deviations always involve a
man losing payoff.3 This in itself is insufficient to ensure that the woman-optimal match-
ing is stochastically stable. The addition of a condition that men’s preferences be suffi-
ciently concave in their ordinal payoff rankings ensures that at least some women achieve
their woman-optimal partnerships. Still, this does not ensure that the woman-optimal
matching is stochastically stable. A further normalization of payoffs, so that players use
their worst payoff of any stable matching as a reference point, achieves this goal.
A useful literature from the perspective of the current paper is the paths to stability
literature in matching problems with non-transferable utility. This focuses on conver-
gence to core allocations in situations where the payoff for an individual depends only
on his partner (Diamantoudi, Xue and Miyagawa, 2004; Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). An-
other related literature is the literature on convergence to the core in cooperative games with
transferable utility (Agastya, 1997; Feldman, 1974; Green, 1974; Newton, 2012). A branch
of this literature has recently explicitly focused on the case in which all relevant coalitions
are pairs – the transferable utility equivalent of the marriage problem, otherwise known
as the assignment problem (Biro´, Bomhoff, Golovach, Kern and Paulusma, 2012; Chen,
Fujishige and Yang, 2012; Nax and Pradelski, 2013; Shapley and Shubik, 1971). Of partic-
ular note is the work of Nax and Pradelski (2013), who adapt the results of the current
paper to obtain selection within the core of the assignment game.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the model and some relevant con-
cepts from the literature. Section 3 gives the main results for marriage problems. Section
4 applies our results to the problem of finding conditions under which the optimal match-
ing for one side of the market is stochastically stable. Sections 5 and 6 extend our main
result to many-to-one matching problems and to roommate problems respectively.
3All the statements in this paragraph can, of course, be restated with the sides of the matchings reversed.
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2 Model
2.1 The marriage problem
We follow the description of the marriage problem in Jackson and Watts (2002). There
is a set of players, N, which is divided into a set of men, M = {m1, . . . ,mk}, and a set of
women, W = {w1, . . . ,wl}. An undirected network g is a set of edges ij ∈ g, each com-
prising a pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, such that ij ∈ g⇔ ji ∈ g. Let G denote the set of
all undirected networks on N. Let g(i) = {j : ij ∈ g} denote the set of players linked to
player i in network g. g(i) = ∅ means that i is single in g. The set of matchings in the
marriage problem, G, is the set of undirected networks in which each woman is linked to
at most one man, and each man is linked to at most one woman:
G = {g ∈ G : (∀ ij ∈ g, i ∈ M⇔ j ∈W), (∀ i ∈ N, |g(i)| ≤ 1)}.
In a slight abuse of notation, we sometimes write g(i) = j for g(i) = {j}. Let µ = {(i, j) :
(∃ g ∈ G : ij ∈ g)} be the set of pairs of players between whom a link can potentially exist.
The vector of utilities obtained from network g by the players is given by u : G →
R|N|. Player i obtains utility ui(g) from network g, and this utility depends only on the
match of i. That is, for each i, ui(g) = ui(g′) if g(i) = g′(i). We assume that players are
never indifferent between two potential matches: g(i) 6= g′(i) implies that ui(g) 6= ui(g′).
Therefore, if g(i) 6=∅, then ui(g) = ui({ig(i)}), and if g(i) =∅, then ui(g) = ui(∅). Define
g− ij := g \ {ij} as the network g with the edge ij removed if it exists in g. Similarly, define
g+ ij := (g \ {kl : k = i, l ∈ g(i) or k = j, l ∈ g(j)}) ∪ {ij} as the network g with the edge ij
added and any existing edges exiting i and j removed.
Definition 2.1 A matching g ∈ G is stable if:
(i) ∀ ij ∈ g, ui(g) > ui(g− ij).
(ii) @ i ∈ M, j ∈W : ui(g + ij) > ui(g) and uj(g + ij) > uj(g).
We denote the set of stable matchings by C. The set of stable matchings corresponds to the core
of the problem: the set of matchings from which no subset of players can improve their payoffs by
removing and adding edges in a coordinated manner.
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2.2 Unperturbed blocking dynamic
We describe a class of unperturbed blocking dynamics.4 Let gt be the network in
period t. At the beginning of period t + 1, a pair of players (i, j) is selected at random
according to a distribution Fgt(.)with full support on µ. Let gt+1 be determined as follows:
(i) If gt(i) = j and either ui(gt − ij) > ui(gt) or uj(gt − ij) > uj(gt), then, with some
probability greater than zero, set gt+1 = gt − ij.
(ii) If gt(i) 6= j, ui(gt + ij) > ui(gt) and uj(gt + ij) > uj(gt) then, with some probability
greater than zero, set gt+1 = gt + ij.
(iii) gt+1 = gt otherwise.
In the terminology of matching problems, a pair (i, j) ∈ µ blocks a matching g if they prefer
one another to their partners in g.
2.3 Perturbed blocking dynamic
Players meet and will usually take the myopically optimal action, whether that is to
stay with their current partner, dissolve an existing partnership, or create a new partner-
ship. However, from time to time, players make mistakes and take actions which reduce
their payoffs, whether it be leaving or creating a partnership. We define a perturbed block-
ing dynamic as a dynamic in which from time to time a pair selected by the dynamic will
sever an existing beneficial link, or create a link which is worse than the status quo for at
least one of the players involved. The results of this paper apply for a large class of per-
turbed blocking dynamics, discussed in the following section. For expositional purposes,
for the examples in the paper we use the well known and understood logit choice rule.
Under the logit choice rule, the probability of a given mistake being made depends on the
payoff loss incurred by the erring players. η > 0 is a parameter. The closer η is to zero,
the lower the probability of mistakes.
At the beginning of period t+ 1, a pair of players (i, j) is selected at random according
to a distribution Fgt(.) with full support on µ. gt+1 is determined as follows:
(i) If gt(i) = j, then gt+1 = gt − ij with probability
1− ∏
k∈{i,j}
e
1
η uk(g
t)
e
1
η uk(g
t)
+ e
1
η uk(g
t−ij) .
4Our unperturbed dynamic is essentially the same as those of Roth and Vande Vate (1990), Jackson and
Watts (2002) and Klaus et al. (2010).
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That is, each of i and j chooses to cut or retain the link ij with probabilities given by
the logit choice rule, and unless both players choose to retain the link, it will be cut.
(ii) If gt(i) 6= j, then gt+1 = gt + ij with probability
∏
k∈{i,j}
e
1
η uk(g
t+ij)
e
1
η uk(g
t)
+ e
1
η uk(g
t+ij)
.
That is, i and j each agree to leave their existing partner and form a new link ij
with probability given by the logit choice rule. Both i and j must agree for a new
partnership to be formed.
(iii) gt+1 = gt otherwise.
The perturbed dynamic defines a Markov chain on G. We denote the transition proba-
bilities of the Markov chain with parameter η by Pη(., .). That is, Pη(g, g′) is the probability
that gt+1 = g′, given that gt = g. Taking the transition probabilities in the limit as η→ 0
gives P0(., .), which belongs to the class of unperturbed dynamics described in Section 2.2.
A pair of players must both agree to form a partnership, while a player can unilaterally
abandon a partnership. The chain with η > 0 is aperiodic and irreducible, hence has a
unique stationary distribution piη. Let pi0 = limη→0piη. A matching g is stochastically stable
if pi0(g) > 0. We denote the set of stochastically stable states by SS.
Definition 2.2
SS := {g ∈ G : pi0(g) > 0}
All stochastically stable matchings belong to recurrent classes of the unperturbed process
(Young, 1993) and from any matching there exists a finite sequence of transitions under
the unperturbed process that culminates in a stable matching being reached (Jackson and
Watts, 2002; Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). Therefore, the only recurrent classes of the
unperturbed process are the individual stable states. Therefore SS ⊆ C. The identity
of the stochastically stable matchings is important, as for small error probabilities the
process will spend almost all of the time at these matchings.
2.4 Costs of transitions
The identity of stochastically stable states depends on the transition probabilities of the
process. To measure the limiting relative magnitude of these probabilities, a cost function
is defined as follows.
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Definition 2.3 The 1-step cost of the process moving from g to g′ is defined as:
c(g, g′) := lim
η→0
−η log Pη(g, g′), (1)
We assume that, for all g, g′ ∈ G, if P0(g, g′) = 0 and Pηˆ(g, g′)> 0 for some ηˆ > 0, equation
(1) is well defined for some c(g, g′)≥ 0.5 If Pη(g, g′) = 0 for all ηˆ ≥ 0, then let c(g, g′) =∞.
We are also interested in the overall cost of moving between g and g′, even if many steps
are required. Let the t-step transition probabilities be given by Ptη(g, g′) ≡ P(gt = g′|g0 =
g, Pη(., .)).
Definition 2.4 The overall cost of the process moving from g to g′ is defined as:
C(g, g′) := min
t∈N
lim
η→0
−η log Ptη(g, g′), (2)
Under the logit choice rule, transition probabilities are sensitive to the amount by
which cardinal utility is reduced. The sum of negative changes in revising players’ pay-
offs for transition g→ g′ is the cost of g→ g′ (Sawa, 2013). We note that the results of
every section aside from the examples in the paper and section 4 are not specific to the
logit dynamic. Our results apply to every irreducible perturbed blocking dynamic which
converges to a member of our class of unperturbed dynamics, for which C(g, g′) exists
and is finite for all g, g′ ∈ G, the limit piη→ pi0 exists6, and for which the cost of a mistake
by a pair (i, j) is independent of the current matching of every player other than i and j.7
A spanning tree rooted at g∗ ∈ C is a directed graph over the set C such that every
g ∈ C other than g∗ has exactly one exiting edge, and the graph has no cycles. The cost
of a spanning tree is the sum of the costs of its edges given by C(., .). A minimum cost
spanning tree is a spanning tree whose cost is lower than or equal to the cost of any other
spanning tree. A state g∗ ∈ C is stochastically stable if and only if there exists a minimum
cost spanning tree rooted at g∗ (Young, 1993). Finding minimum cost spanning trees
can be difficult.8 The principal contribution of the current paper is to show that any
stochastically stable matching, that is to say any root of a minimum cost spanning tree,
must be in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation. We call a
transition g→ g′ from a matching g ∈ G the least cost deviation from g if it has the lowest
5This is equivalent to assuming weakly regular Markov chains. A broad class of noisy best responses,
e.g. best response with mutations and probit choice rule, falls into this category. See Sandholm (2010).
6This condition could be avoided if stochastically stable states were instead defined as states for which
piη(.) 6→ 0 as η→ 0.
7That is, for all g ∈ G: c(g, g− ij) and c(g, g + ij) depend on g only through g(i) and g(j).
8The same applies to radius-(modified)coradius methods (Ellison, 2000).
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cost of all possible 1-step transitions from g.
Definition 2.5 Denote the set of possible least cost deviations from g ∈ G by:
L(g) := argmin
g′ 6=g
c(g, g′)
and the set of players involved in least cost deviations from g ∈ G by:
NL(g) := {(i, j) ∈ M×W : ∃ g′ ∈ L(g) : g′ = g− ij or g′ = g + ij}
cL(g) will be used to denote the cost of the least cost deviation from g.9
cL(g) := min
g′ 6=g
c(g, g′).
Note that for g /∈ C, there is a zero cost transition from g. We use the word deviation as we
shall be interested in the application of these concepts to g ∈ C. If the easiest transition at
matching g is for two players to form a partnership, then under the logit choice rule:
cL(g) = min
ij/∈g
[
max{ui(g)− ui(g + ij),0}+max{uj(g)− uj(g + ij),0}
]
, (3)
whereas if the easiest transition at matching g is for a player to dissolve an existing part-
nership, then under the logit choice rule:
cL(g) = min
i:g(i) 6=∅
[max{ui(g)− ui(g− ig(i)),0}] = min
i:g(i) 6=∅
[max{ui(g)− ui(∅),0}] . (4)
For the logit choice rule, cL(g) is therefore the minimum of the quantities in (3) and (4).
Example 2.6 Suppose that M = {m1,m2,m3}, W = {w1,w2,w3}, and that the matrix giving
players’ payoffs from a given match is given below. For example, the top left cell tells us that
w1 gets a payoff of 30 from being matched with m1. Assume 2 < a < 4 and that payoffs from
remaining unmatched are zero for every player. Let the perturbed dynamic be the logit choice rule.
w1 w2 w3
m1 4,30 5,20 a,30
m2 5,20 4,30 a,20
m3 5,10 4,10 a,10
9This differs from the concept of the radius of a stable state g ∈ C (Ellison, 2000, citing a no longer extant
working paper of Evans, 1993). The radius is defined as R(g) =ming′∈C\{g}C(g, g′) and requires a different
stable state to be reached by the process. It turns out that in the problems considered in the current paper
cL(g) = R(g) for all stable matchings outside of a specific set, but this does not follow from the definitions.
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The stable matchings are gW = {m1w1,m2w2,m3w3} and gM = {m1w2,m2w1,m3w3}. gW
is the woman optimal matching and gM the man optimal matching. The least cost deviation from
gW has {m1w3} forming a link. Let g′ denote the resulting matching. The cost of this deviation
is:
cL(gW) = c(gW , g′) = um1(gW)− um1(g′) = 4− a
This can be followed by {m2w1}, {m1w2}, {m3w3} forming links sequentially. These transitions
have zero cost so the overall cost of a transition from gW to gM is C(gW , gM) = 4− a.
The least cost deviation from gM has {m1,w1} forming a link. Let g′′ denote the resulting
matching. The cost of this deviation is:
cL(gM) = c(gM, g′′) = um1(gM)− um1(g′′) = 5− 4 = 1.
This can be followed by {m2w2} forming a link. This transition has zero cost so the overall cost of
a transition from gM to gW is C(gM, gW) = 1. The cost of the transition from gW to gM is greater
than the opposite transition if a < 3 and lower if a > 3. Our main result in the next section will
show that one can usually ignore all but the first step in each of these transitions: if a stable match-
ing has a strictly higher cL(.) than all other stable matchings, then it is uniquely stochastically
stable. Transitions subsequent to the initial deviation can be ignored. For this example, if a < 3,
gW is uniquely stochastically stable, and if a > 3, gM is uniquely stochastically stable.
3 Stochastically stable matchings
Define OS, the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation:
OS =
{
g ∈ G : cL(g) = max
g′∈G
cL(g′)
}
.
As cL(g) is strictly positive only for g ∈ C, it must be that OS ⊆ C. We will show that OS
contains SS: a stochastically stable matching must be comparatively robust against one-
shot deviation. If OS contains only one matching, then that matching must be uniquely
stochastically stable. In example 2.6 we see that cL(gW) = 4− a and cL(gM) = 1. Therefore,
if a < 3, then OS = {gW}, whereas if a > 3, then OS = {gM}.
Klaus et al. (2010) show that a single mistake suffices to move from any g ∈ C to some
other g′ ∈ C. We show that the least cost deviation from a stable matching g /∈ OS is
enough to escape from its basin of attraction, and that the unperturbed dynamic can sub-
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sequently lead the process closer to OS ⊆ C. This result is proved in Lemma 3.4, from
which the main theorem is proven using a minimal cost spanning tree argument. First,
we present a couple of lemmas which assist in the proof of Lemma 3.4.
The following lemma shows that the least cost deviation from a stable matching g /∈OS
cannot involve two single players forming a partnership.
Lemma 3.1 Suppose that g ∈ C and g /∈ OS. If (i, j) ∈ NL(g), then g(i) 6=∅ and/or g(j) 6=∅.
Proof. Suppose g(i) = ∅ and g(j) = ∅. Then, i and j are single in every stable match-
ing (Theorem 2.22 of Roth and Sotomayor (1992)), including the matchings in OS. As
(i, j) ∈ NL(g), g+ ij ∈ L(g). Then for g∗ ∈OS, cL(g∗)≤ c(g∗, g∗+ ij) = c(g, g+ ij) = cL(g),
therefore g ∈OS, which contradicts our premise.
The next lemma demonstrates that if a pair is involved in a least cost deviation from a
stable matching g /∈ OS, then they do not both have the same current partner as in some
matching within OS.
Lemma 3.2 Suppose that g ∈ C and g /∈OS. If (i, j) ∈ NL(g), then for all g∗ ∈OS, g(i) 6= g∗(i)
and/or g(j) 6= g∗(j).
Proof. Let g∗ ∈ OS. Suppose g(i) = g∗(i) and g(j) = g∗(j). If g(i) = j, then cL(g∗) ≤
c(g∗, g∗ − ij) = c(g− ij) = cL(g). If g(i) 6= j, then cL(g∗) ≤ c(g∗, g∗ + ij) = c(g, g + ij) =
cL(g). Therefore g ∈OS, which contradicts our premise.
We now present the key lemma, which asserts that following the least cost deviation
from any stable matching g /∈ OS, the unperturbed dynamic can move to another stable
matching which is strictly closer to OS than the initial matching. First, we define an index
m which measures the similarity between matchings.
Definition 3.3 m(g, g′) is the number of players who have the same partner in g and g′.
m(g, g′) := |{i ∈ N : g(i) = g′(i)}|
Lemma 3.4 (Getting Closer Lemma) Let g∗ ∈ OS. Suppose that g ∈ C and g /∈ OS. Let
g1 ∈ L(g). Then, ∃ g′ ∈ C, t ∈N+, such that m(g∗, g′) > m(g∗, g) and Pt0(g1, g′) > 0.
The proof is given in the appendix. The proof shows that from any g ∈ C, g /∈ OS, any
least cost deviation leads to an unstable state g1 /∈ C. Given some target matching g∗ ∈OS,
starting from g1, it is possible, under the unperturbed dynamic, to reach an unstable
state, say g˜ /∈ C, which is at least as close to g∗ as g is to g∗. That is, m(g∗, g˜) ≥ m(g∗, g).
As g˜ is unstable, the structure of the marriage problem ensures (see Lemma 5 of Klaus
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et al., 2010 and Lemma 5.5 of the current paper) that, starting from g˜, it is possible, under
the unperturbed dynamic, to reach a stable matching g′ ∈ C which is strictly closer to
g∗ than g˜ is to g∗. That is, m(g∗, g′) > m(g∗, g˜). In combination, these inequalities give
m(g∗, g′)> m(g∗, g). The least cost deviation from g has sufficed to move the process to a
stable matching which is closer to some g∗ ∈ OS. Lemma 3.4 in hand, we can prove the
main theorem.
Theorem 3.5 SS ⊆OS.
The formal proof is in the appendix. In brief, any stochastically stable matching must
be the root of a minimum cost spanning tree. If a tree is rooted at some g ∈ C, g /∈ OS,
then Lemma 3.4 can be used to build another tree rooted at some g∗ ∈ OS. Starting at
g, use Lemma 3.4 to add edges between stable matchings which get progressively closer
to g∗. We obtain a sequence (g = g1, . . . , gL = g∗) with edges between gi and gi+1 for i =
1, . . . , L− 1. Each of these new edges has the cost of a lowest cost deviation, C(gi, gi+1) =
cL(gi). Deleting the edge exiting g∗, we are left with a tree rooted at g∗. As g /∈ OS,
g∗ ∈ OS, the cost of the new edge exiting g must be lower than the cost of the deleted
edge which exited g∗. So the tree rooted at g∗ has a lower total cost than the total cost of
the tree rooted at g. Therefore no tree rooted at g can be a minimum cost spanning tree.
That is, g /∈ SS.
So, SS ⊆ OS. This is important, as the set OS is defined solely by reference to lo-
cal properties of the stable matchings. Stochastically stable matchings must be match-
ings which are most robust to one-shot deviation. If OS is a singleton, then the unique
stochastically stable state can be determined solely by looking at the lowest cost one-shot
deviation from stable states: there is no need to resort to minimal cost spanning trees or
to radius-coradius methods, as illustrated by the next example.
Example 3.6 Suppose that M = {m1,m2,m3}, W = {w1,w2,w3}, and that the matrix giving
their payoffs from a given match is shown below.10 The payoffs from being single are zero for all
men and women. Let the perturbed dynamic be the logit choice rule.
w1 w2 w3
m1 10,1 5,5 1,10
m2 1,10 10,1 5,5
m3 5,5 1,10 10,1
10This example is a version of Example 2.17 of Roth and Sotomayor (1992) in which we have removed a
man and a woman.
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There are three stable matchings as below.
g1 = {m1w1,m2w2,m3w3}, g2 = {m1w2,m2w3,m3w1},
g3 = {m1w3,m2w1,m3w2}.
Observe that g1 is man-optimal and g3 is woman-optimal. It is easy to show that,
cL(g) = 1 for g ∈ {g1, g3}.
For example, one of the least cost deviations from g1 is w1 becoming single, which costs 1. Followed
by {m1w2}, {m2w3}, {m3w1} forming links sequentially, the dynamic will reach g2.
Moreover, cL(g2) = 4. One of the least cost deviations from g2 is for m1 and w1 to partner,
causing the payoff of w1 to decrease by 4. These values for cL(.) imply that OS = {g2}. So
SS = {g2}, the unique stochastically stable matching is g2.
We can further characterize properties of matchings in OS for generic payoffs.
Remark 3.7 For generic payoffs, the set of pairs of players involved in least cost deviations is a
singleton, and is identical across matchings in OS. That is, NL(g) = NL(g′) for all g, g′ ∈ OS.
This implies that g(i) = g′(i) and g(j) = g′(j) for (i, j) ∈ NL(g) for all g, g′ ∈OS.
Under the logit choice rule, OS corresponds to a non-transferable utility version of the
least-core (Maschler et al., 1979).
Remark 3.8 For A ⊆ N, let G(A, g) be the set of matchings g′ 6= g such that ij ∈ g′ for all
i, j /∈ A, ij ∈ g, and ij /∈ g′ for all i /∈ A, ij /∈ g. Then the excess of A at g is defined as
e(A, g) := max
g′∈G(A,g)∑i∈A
min{0, ui(g′)− ui(g)},
and the least-core is
LC := argmin
g∈C
max
A 6=∅
e(A, g).
In marriage problems, the maximum excess can always be found by analyzing A such that |A| ≤ 2.
For the logit choice rule, it then follows that OS = LC. Note that in contrast to the definition of
excess in Maschler et al. (1979), we do not allow players’ gains to enter the calculation. Within the
core, excess is a measure of the amount by which a constraint is satisfied, and in a non-transferable
utility setup this is unaffected by potential gains in payoff.
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Finally, we note that the proof of Theorem 3.5 extends to give a bound on convergence
times.
Remark 3.9 It follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 3.5 that the modified-coradius (see
Ellison, 2000) of OS equals maxg/∈OS cL(g) and that therefore, starting from any matching, the
expected hitting time of OS is O(e
1
η maxg/∈OS cL(g)).
4 An application: Stochastic stability of woman-optimal
matching
Many real-world applications of two-sided matching theory select a stable matching
most preferred by one population. For example, the old algorithm used by the hospital-
intern matching program in the U.S. selects the hospital-optimal matching, and the new
algorithm selects the intern-optimal matching.11 However, the desired matching may
not be stochastically stable, so even if implemented in the short run, it may be rarely
observed in the long run. In this section, we consider sufficient conditions under which
the unique stochastically stable matching is a matching optimal for one population. These
conditions turn out to be strong. We choose to seek conditions under which the woman-
optimal matching is stochastically stable. To simplify analysis, we assume that transitions
between stable matchings are driven by errors by men. An alternative assumption with a
similar effect would be to assume that men are considerably less sensitive to differences
between prospective partners than are women.
Assumption 1 Women do not make mistakes.
This assumption on its own does not predict that stable matchings which are better for
any particular side will be chosen. cL(g) could still be low or high for any particular stable
matching. However, it does lead to some interesting results. It is assumed throughout this
section that the perturbed dynamic is the logit choice rule. To begin, the following lemma
shows that if a least cost deviation involves a married man becoming single, then that
man must be currently partnered with his worst partner of any stable matching.12
Lemma 4.1 Suppose g ∈ C and Assumption 1 holds. If i ∈M and g− ig(i) ∈ L(g), then g(i) =
gW(i).
11There was a significant change in the program in 1998. We mean by the old algorithm the algorithm
used until 1998 and by the new one the algorithm used since then. See Roth (1984) for details of the old
algorithm and Roth and Peranson (1999) for the new one.
12It follows that only players who are already relatively unhappy will make the mistake of returning to
single life.
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Proof. Suppose g(i) 6= gW(i). Then, as gW(i) prefers i to g(gW(i)), i prefers gW(i) to
remaining single, and Assumption 1 holds, a deviation from g to g + igW(i) must have
lower cost than a deviation to g− ig(i), contradicting its being a least cost deviation.
The following lemma shows that if a least cost deviation has any man leaving his
current partner for a currently single woman, he must currently be in his least preferred
stable matching.13
Lemma 4.2 Suppose that g ∈ C and Assumption 1 holds. Suppose i ∈ M, g(i) 6= ∅, g(j) = ∅.
If (i, j) ∈ NL(g), then g(i) = gW(i).
Proof. Suppose i ∈ M and g(i) 6= gW(i). Then, gW(i) prefers i to g(gW(i)). As women
do not make mistakes (assumption 1) it must be the case that j prefers i to remaining
single. i must prefer gW(i) to j, otherwise (i, j) would be a blocking pair for gW . But
then a deviation from g to g + igW(i) must have lower cost than a deviation to g + ij,
contradicting its being a least cost deviation.
The next lemma shows that if a man and a woman participate in a least cost deviation,
and the man is not already with his least preferred partner of any stable matching, then
the woman is not already with her most preferred partner of any stable matching. 14
Lemma 4.3 Suppose that g ∈ C and Assumption 1 holds. Suppose i ∈ M, j ∈W. Let (i, j) ∈
NL(g). If g(i) 6= gW(i), then g(j) 6= gW(j).
Proof. If j = gW(i), then g(j) 6= gW(j) and we are done. j prefers i to g(j) by assumption 1.
If j 6= gW(i), it must be the case that i prefers j to gW(i), as (i, j)∈ NL(g). So, if g(j) = gW(j),
then (i, j) would be a blocking pair for gW , contradicting its being a stable matching.
4.1 A specific utility function
In this section we assume that players are much more sensitive to differences between
partners close to the bottom of their ordinal ranking of prospective partners. They are
more sensitive to ugliness than to beauty.15 Let xi(.) : G→ Z denote an ordinal ranking
(low numbers being worse) of g ∈ G in player i’s preferences. That is, for g ∈ G: if g′ is
such that ui(g′)> ui(g) and there does not exist g′′ such that ui(g′)> ui(g′′)> ui(g), then
13It follows that if you are concerned about your partner making a mistake and quitting you, unless he
or she is already relatively unhappy, you should not be concerned about single rivals.
14Similarly to the previous footnote, neither should you be concerned about rivals partnered with their
best partner of any stable matching.
15To quote the Marquis de Sade: “Beauty belongs to the sphere of the simple, the ordinary, whilst ug-
liness is something extraordinary, and there is no question but that every ardent imagination prefers in
lubricity, the extraordinary to the commonplace.”
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xi(g′) = xi(g) + 1. The utility function will convert ordinal preferences to cardinal utility
values in a particular way.16
Assumption 2
∀ i ∈ M, ui(g) = v(xi(g)) = βM
(
1− e−xi(g)
)
,
∀ i ∈ F, ui(g) = v(xi(g)) = βF
(
1− e−xi(g)
)
.
Note that any decrease in utility due to a rematching is always greater than the possible
gain from any rematching. This is due to the functional form of the utility: it is very
concave. Due to this, any given man will now be much more likely to make mistakes
when matched to a better partner than when matched to a worse one.
Denote the set of men who can participate in a least cost deviation from g by I∗(g).
I∗(g) := {i ∈ M : ∃ (i, j) ∈ NL(g)}
Let i∗(g) ∈ I∗(g) denote a representative man. Let G˜ be the set of matchings in which at
least one of the men in I∗(g) has the same partner as in gW .
G˜ := {g ∈ C : g(i∗(g)) = gW(i∗(g)) for some i∗(g) ∈ I∗(g)}.
Note that gW ∈ G˜ by definition.
Theorem 4.4 If Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied, then OS⊆ G˜.
Proof. We show that, for all i ∈M and g ∈ C, some deviation involving i from g is weakly
less costly than any deviation involving i from gW . Then, we show that g /∈OS if g /∈ G˜.
For any i ∈M, g ∈ C, such that g(i) 6= gW(i), the least costly of all deviations involving
i from g, that is a deviation to g− ig(i) or to g+ ij for some j ∈W, has cost bounded above
by the cost of a deviation to g + igW(i):
c(g, g + igW(i)) = ui(g)− ui(gW) < βM − βM
(
1− e−xi(gW)
)
= βM e−xi(gW).
Any deviation involving i ∈ M from gW , that is a deviation to gW − igW(i) or to gW + ij
for some j ∈W, has cost bounded below by:
ui(gW)− max
g∈G
ui(g)<ui(gW)
ui(g) = v(xi(gW))− v(xi(gW)− 1)
16An assumption that βM  βF would ensure that men are considerably less sensitive to differences
between prospective partners than are women. As noted above, this could replace assumption 1.
16
= βM
(
1− e−xi(gW)
)
− βM
(
1− e−xi(gW)+1
)
= βM e−xi(gW)+1 − βM e−xi(gW)
= βM e−xi(gW)(e− 1).
So for i ∈M, g(i) 6= gW(i), there exists a deviation from g involving i which is strictly less
costly than any deviation from gW which involves i.
Now consider deviations which involve i ∈M for whom g(i) = gW(i). As every j ∈W
weakly prefers gW to g, we have for all i ∈ M,
{j ∈W : uj({ij}) > uj(g)} ⊇ {j ∈W : uj({ij}) > uj(gW)}.
This implies that every deviation from gW which involves i ∈ M, g(i) = gW(i), is also
possible from g. So for i ∈ M, g(i) = gW(i), there exists a deviation from g involving i
which is weakly less costly than any deviation from gW which involves i.
The arguments above show that cL(g)≤ cL(gW). Now, assume g /∈ G˜. Then g(i∗(g)) 6=
gW(i∗(g)) for all i∗(g) ∈ I∗(g). There therefore exist deviations from g involving i∗(g) ∈
I∗(g) which are strictly less costly than any deviation from gW . As the cost of deviations
by these players is binding for the determination of cL(g), it must be that cL(g)< cL(gW).
Therefore g /∈OS.
So we have that if players on one side of the market are insensitive to payoff differ-
ences compared to those on the other side (captured by assuming that the other side do
not make errors), and players are more sensitive to differences between prospective part-
ners lower down their preference ordering, then insensitive players will usually do badly
in stochastically stable matchings.17 However, note that if m1 ranks w1, w2 at the top of
his preference ordering, w1 and w2 rank m1 at the top of their preference orderings, and
m1 likes w1 as much as any other man likes any other woman, then for any g ∈ C we
have that m1 ∈ I∗(g), g(m1) = w1, and g + m1w2 ∈ L(g). That is, G˜ = OS = C. True love
and close competition make it easy to comment on how the lovers match in any stochas-
tically stable matching, but make it difficult to comment on the behavior of everybody
else. This is a bigger problem than it might seem, as although gW is always in G˜, gW is
not necessarily stochastically stable. That is, it is possible that pi0(G˜)> 0 and pi0(gW) = 0.
Example 4.5 Suppose that M = {m1,m2,m3}, W = {w1,w2,w3,w4}, and that the matrix giv-
ing their ordinal preference ranking from a given match is given in the left table of figure 1. If
player i is unmatched in g, then xi(g) = 0. The conversion of ordinal to cardinal payoffs is as in
the preceding section. For example, the top left cell tells us that w1 gets a payoff of βW(1− e−3)
17In fact, the existence of even a single player who is very insensitive compared to every other player is
enough to give this result.
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w1 w2 w3 w4
m1 2,3 1,3 −1,2 −2,2
m2 2,2 −1,2 3,1 1,3
m3 2,1 −1,1 1,3 3,1
w1 w2 w3 w4
m1 0,0 −1,3 −3,1 −4,1
m2 1,−1 −2,2 2,0 0,2
m3 1,−2 −2,1 0,2 2,0
Figure 1: The left table gives preferences of the example of section 4.5. The right table
normalizes these preferences as per assumption 3.
from being matched with m1. We assume Assumption 1 still holds.
gW = {m1w1,w2,m3w3,m2w4} and gM = {m1w1,w2,m3w4,m2w3} are the stable match-
ings. Note that m1 ∈ I∗(gW) ∩ I∗(gM), gW(m1) = gM(m1), gW + m1w2 ∈ L(gW), and
gM + m1w2 ∈ L(gM). Therefore {gW , gM} = OS = G˜. A least cost transition from gW to gM
starts with {m1w2} forming a link. The cost of this deviation is:
c(gW , gW + m1w2) = um1(gW)− um1(gW + m1w2) = v(2)− v(1) = e−1 − e−2
This can be followed by {m2w1}, {m3w4}, {m1w1}, {m2w3} forming links sequentially. These
transitions have zero cost so the overall cost C(gW , gM) = e−1 − e−2.
No least cost transition from gM to gW can commence with such a low cost deviation. m2 and
m3 cannot make such a low cost deviation by matching with w1 in error, as w1 prefers to remain
matched to m1. Starting a path by {m1w2} forming a link leads to gM + m1w2, from which no
zero cost path can lead to gW . m2 and m3 are unwilling to leave their existing partners, and
eventually {m1,w1} can rematch at zero cost to return the process to gM. Therefore the transition
from gM to gW must have a higher cost than the reverse, and gM is uniquely stochastically stable.
4.2 A sufficient condition on preferences
Sufficient conditions for the stochastic stability of gW can be achieved with an addi-
tional condition: a normalization. Take the worst possible stable outcome for the men to
be a reference point in the sense that they all receive the same utility in such a matching:
if ui(gW) does not vary across i ∈ M, then we can give a sharper characterization. In fact,
under this assumption, the unique stochastically stable matching is the woman-optimal
matching.
Assumption 3 xi(gW) = 0 for all i ∈ M.
Theorem 4.6 If Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are satisfied, then OS = {gW}.
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Proof. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.4,
cL(gW) ≥min
i∈M
βM e−xi(gW)(e− 1) = βM (e− 1) > βM
Suppose g ∈ C, g 6= gW . There exists i such that g(i) 6= gW(i). Note that gW(i) prefers
gW to g, so cL(g) must be bounded above by c(g, g + igW(i)), i.e.
cL(g) ≤ c(g, g + igW(i)) = ui(g)− ui(gW(i)) < βM e−xi(gW) = βM.
Therefore cL(g) < cL(gW) and g /∈OS.
The normalized payoffs from the example in section 4.5 are given in the right table of
figure 1. OS now contains gW only.
5 Many-to-one matching problems
We extend our analysis to many-to-one matching problems, also known as college
admissions problems. The difference from one-to-one matching problems is that each
agent of one population, the colleges, may be matched with more than one agent of the
other population, the students. Each student is matched with at most one college.
There are two sets, K = {K1, . . . ,Kl} and S = {s1, . . . , sm}, of colleges and students re-
spectively. There is positive integer qK, called the quota, of college K which indicates the
maximum number of positions college K may fill. That is, |g(K)| ≤ qK. All qK positions of
college K are identical. The set of matchings in the college admissions problem is:
G = {g ∈ G : (∀ ij ∈ g, i ∈ S⇔ j ∈ K), (∀ i ∈ S, |g(i)| ≤ 1), (∀Kj ∈ K, |g(Kj)| ≤ qKj)}.
The preferences of college K are determined by the subset of students to which K is
matched. That is, although g(K) can now be of size greater than one, it is still the case
that g(K) = g′(K) implies that uK(g) = uK(g′). Preferences over subsets of students are
still assumed to be strict: g(K) 6= g′(K)⇔ uK(g) 6= uK(g′).
Definition 5.1 A matching g is in the core of a matching problem, denoted g ∈ C′ if @A ⊆ N,
g′ ∈ G such that:
(i) i /∈ A, j /∈ A, ij ∈ g⇒ ij ∈ g′
(ii) ij /∈ g, ij ∈ g′⇒ i ∈ A, j ∈ A
(iii) i ∈ A⇒ ui(g′) > ui(g).
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We restrict our attention to responsive preferences (Roth, 1985). If a college has re-
sponsive preferences, then its preferences over any two students si, sj are independent of
the other students to whom it is matched. That is, if the college prefers si to sj, and T is
some subset of students which includes neither si nor sj, then the college prefers T ∪ si to
T ∪ sj. We assume that all colleges have responsive preferences.
Definition 5.2 The preferences of college K ∈K over sets of students are responsive if they satisfy
the following conditions.
(I) If g(K) = g′(K) ∪ {si} \ {sj}, si /∈ g′(K), sj ∈ g′(K), then uK({Ksi}) > uK({Ksj})⇔
uK(g) > uK(g′).
(II) If g(K) = g′(K) ∪ {si}, si /∈ g′(K), then uK({Ksi}) > uK(∅)⇔ uK(g) > uK(g′).
Following Chapter 5 of Roth and Sotomayor (1992), we consider a related marriage
problem, in which each college K is broken into qK positions of itself: k1, . . . ,kqK , each of
which has a quota of one. In the related market, the players are students and college
positions each of which has a quota of one. The college positions are assumed to have
the same preferences over the individual students as their original college. With a slight
abuse of notation, we let K denote the set of positions in college K, i.e. K = {k1, . . . ,kqK},
g(K) =
⋃
1≤i≤qK g(ki).
We assume that both the unperturbed and the perturbed dynamics forbid positions
of the same college from competing for students. In the original problem, college K is
indifferent between a student filling position ki ∈ K or k j ∈ K. Hence it is unrealistic
that two positions within the same college compete with one another for a student. We
prevent such competition by imposing the assumption below. 18
Assumption 4 Let ν(g) := {(i,k j) : k j ∈ K ∈ K, i 6= g(k j), i ∈ g(K)}. At the beginning of
period t + 1, the updating pair of players will be chosen according to a distribution with full
support on µ \ ν(gt).
The next lemma shows that the set of absorbing states, C, of the dynamic in section 2.2
amended to satisfy Assumption 4 corresponds to the core, C′, in the college admission
problem.
Lemma 5.3 For g′ ∈ G, let g ∈ G satisfy: for all K = {k1, . . . ,kqK} ∈ K,
(a) i ∈ g′(K)⇔ ∃ k j ∈ K : g(k j) = i.
18There may exist cases in which different departments of a college compete for students. In such cases,
we let K and K′ be such that K 6= K′ represent different departments.
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(b) ∀ i ∈ N, |g(i)| ≤ 1.
Then g′ ∈ C′⇔ g ∈ C.
Note that the logit dynamic under Assumption 4 is still irreducible. For any network
g, a pair (g(k),k) will cut their link with positive probability in the perturbed dynamic
satisfying Assumption 4. For all g, g′ ∈ G, there is a positive probability that the perturbed
dynamic starting with g will become the empty network within |N| periods, and then will
become g′ within another |N| periods.
Definition 5.4 Define the set of matchings equivalent to g as:
Eq(g) = {g′ ∈ G : g′(K) = g(K) ∀K ∈ K}.
In words, Eq(g) is the set of matchings in which students are matched to the same colleges
as they are in matching g, i.e. matchings in Eq(g) are identical in the original college
admission problem.
We make a natural symmetry assumption on the dynamic regarding the behavior of
positions of a college. We assume that the cost of transitions is unaffected by the labelling
of the positions of any given college.
Assumption 5 If g˜ ∈ Eq(g); k1,k2 ∈ Ki : g(k1) = g˜(k2); s ∈ S : g(s), g˜(s) ∈ Kj ∈K or g(s) =
g˜(s) =∅; then:
(i) c(g, g + k1s) = c(g˜, g˜ + k2s),
(ii) If g(k1) 6=∅, then c(g, g− k1g(k1)) = c(g˜, g˜− k2 g˜(k2)), and
(iii) If g(s) 6=∅, then c(g, g− sg(s)) = c(g˜, g˜− sg˜(s)).
Note that the logit choice rule satisfies Assumption 5.
Take any unstable matching g /∈ C, and a target stable matching g′ ∈ C. The following
lemma, which is important to the results of the paper, shows that, starting from g, the
unperturbed dynamic can move to some matching gT which is strictly closer to g′ than
g is. This lemma extends the implications of Lemma 5 of Klaus et al. (2010) to many-to-
one matching problems. First, define a similarity function for the many-to-one matching
problem:
m¯(g, g′) := max
gˆ∈Eq(g′)
m(g, gˆ) (5)
Note that m¯(g, g′)≥m(g, g′). Also note that m(., .)≡ m¯(., .) for one-to-one matching prob-
lems.
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Lemma 5.5 Assume Assumption 4 holds. Let g /∈ C, g′ ∈ C. Then, ∃T ∈N+, gT ∈ G, such that
PT0 (g, gT) > 0 and m¯(gT, g
′) > m¯(g, g′).
The proof is left to the appendix, and makes use of the fact that given g and g′, there is
no student matched to different positions of the same college under g and the g∗ which
solves the maximization in (5).
Lemma 5.6 Let g /∈ C, g′ ∈ C. Let
g∗ ∈ argmax
gˆ∈Eq(g′)
m(g, gˆ).
For all i ∈ S, g(i) ∈ K, g∗(i) ∈ K⇒ g(i) = g∗(i).
Proof. Assume i ∈ S, g(i) ∈ K, g∗(i) ∈ K, g(i) 6= g∗(i). Let g∗∗ = g∗+ ig(i) + g∗(i)g∗(g(i)).
Then g∗∗ ∈ Eq(g∗) = Eq(g′) and m(g, g∗∗) ≥ m(g, g∗) + 2, contradicting the definition of
g∗.
The proof of Lemma 5.5 relies on the construction of closed cycles of players who have
strict preferences between g and g∗. Lemma 5.6 ensures that players who have the same
partner in g and g∗, and who are therefore indifferent between the two matchings, form
separate cycles of size two.
Lemma 5.5 directly implies the following corollary. It is similar to Roth and Vande Vate
(1990) except that we have not assumed students to have strict preferences over the posi-
tions within colleges.19
Corollary 5.7 (Random paths to stability) Suppose a college admission problem, its related
marriage problem, and an unperturbed dynamic satisfying Assumption 4. For any g /∈ C, there
exists T ∈N+, g∗ ∈ C, such that PT0 (g, g∗) > 0.
Define cL(g) and OS as in the one-to-one matching problem. Using Lemma 5.5, a
many-to-one version of Lemma 3.4 can be proved. Then, we have the following theorem.
See Appendix for proofs.
Theorem 5.8 Under Assumptions 4 and 5, SS ⊆OS.
The implications of Assumption 4 for the costs of deviations under the logit choice
rule are as follows. Let
E(g) = {ik j : ik j /∈ g, ik j ∈ g′ for some g′ ∈ Eq(g)}.
19See Chapter 5 of Roth and Sotomayor (1992) for a way to construct strict preferences in such problems.
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In words, ik j ∈ E(g) means that i and k j ∈ K are not matched in g, but i is matched with
some kl ∈K, kl 6= k j. Assumption 4 implies that pairs in E(g)may not deviate if the process
is in g. For the logit dynamic, expressions for cL(g) will be as in expressions (3) and (4),
but with the minimum being taken over ij /∈ g∪ E(g) in expression (3). The next example
shows an application of Theorem 5.8 with a note emphasizing the role of Assumption 4.
Example 5.9 Let S = {s1, s2, s3}, K = {K,K′}, K = {k1,k2} and K′ = {k3}. Assume that a
college’s utility is additive over the utility it obtains from each student, and that the perturbed
dynamic is the logit choice rule. Preferences are given by the following matrix. The payoff from
remaining unmatched is assumed to be zero.
k1 k2 k3
s1 10,10 10,10 5,10
s2 10,8 10,8 6,8
s3 5,9 5,9 10,5
Observe that under Assumption 4, the set of stable matchings is C= {g1, g2, g3, g4} where
g1 = {(s1,k1), (s2,k2), (s3,k3)}, g2 = {(s1,k2), (s2,k1), (s3,k3)},
g3 = {(s1,k1), (s2,k3), (s3,k2)}, g4 = {(s1,k2), (s2,k3), (s3,k1)}.
The first two matchings are equivalent, g2 ∈ Eq(g1). s1 and s2 are matched to K in both matchings.
Similarly, g4 ∈ Eq(g3).
Suppose that the current network is g1. In the absence of Assumption 4, a deviation by (s1,k2)
to g1 + s1k2 could occur with cost zero. Subsequently, (s2,k3) and (s3,k1) could form partner-
ships, and the process could reach g4 without any additional cost. So C(g1, g4) would equal zero.
Similarly, we can cycle between all of the matchings in C.
Under Assumption 4 (s1,k2) will never be selected as a revising pair when the current state
is g1. The least cost deviation from g1 is L(g1) = {g1 + s2k3} with cost cL(g1) = 4. Also,
cL(g2) = 4, cL(g3) = 1, cL(g4) = 1. OS = {g1, g2}. Since g1 and g2 are equivalent, the unique
stochastically stable matching is that K and K′ are matched to {s1, s2} and s3 respectively.
6 Roommate problems
In the one-sided matching problem, or roommate problem, the set of admissible
matchings is not restricted to be bipartite. Anyone can partner with anyone. The set
23
of networks of interest is broadened to:
G = {g ∈ G : (∀ i ∈ N, |g(i)| ≤ 1)}.
Gusfield and Irving (1989) show that two key properties of marriage problems extend to
all roommate problems with strict preferences over partners. Firstly, the set of unmatched
players is the same at every stable matching. Secondly, if g, g′ ∈ C, i prefers g to g′, g(i) = j,
g′(i) = k 6= j, then both j and k prefer g′ to g. These properties are exactly those used in our
results of section 3. Furthermore, Diamantoudi et al. (2004) show that if C is nonempty,
then there exists a sequence of mutually beneficial blockings ending in C. In the context
of this paper, this means that nonempty C implies that all recurrent classes of the unper-
turbed Markov process lie in C. There are no absorbing cycles. Assuming nonemptiness
of C, lemmas 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 still hold. It follows that:
Theorem 6.1 If C 6=∅, then SS ⊆OS.
Thus our main result does not rely on two-sidedness of the matching market.
7 Conclusion
This paper has shown that in marriage problems, roommate problems and college ad-
mission problems, all stochastically stable matchings are in the class of matchings which
are most robust to one-shot deviation. There are two significant implications of this from
a market design perspective. Firstly, a desired matching may not be stochastically stable,
so even if implemented in the short run, in a world in which people make the occasional
mistake, it would be rarely observed in the long run. Secondly, making a desired match-
ing more robust to one-shot deviation than any other matching will suffice to make it
uniquely stochastically stable. The main results, which link stochastic stability to a local
property of the individual matchings, are derived from the structure of stable matchings
and from the unperturbed blocking dynamic. The class of unperturbed blocking dynam-
ics we use is common in the paths to stability literature. Further attempts to extend our
results to, for example, hedonic games or many-to-one matchings with complementari-
ties, are left for future work.
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A Appendix
In this section, we prove Theorem 5.8. Theorem 3.5 is implied by Theorem 5.8, as
Assumptions 4 and 5 do not have any effect in the one-to-one setting. Similarly, Lemma
3.4 is implied by its many-to-one equivalent, Lemma A.4. The proof of Lemma 5.5, one of
our key lemmas, is given as below.
Proof of Lemma 5.5. Let
g∗ ∈ argmax
gˆ∈Eq(g′)
m(g, gˆ).
If there exists i ∈ N such that g(i) 6= ∅ and c(g, g − ig(i)) = 0 and g∗(i) = ∅, then let
gT = g− ig(i) and we are done: m¯(gT, g′) ≥ m(gT, g∗) > m(g, g∗) = m¯(g, g′).
If there does not exist such an i ∈ N, let each i ∈ N such that ui(∅) > ui(g) leave their
partners. Denote the resulting matching g1. Note that m(g1, g∗) = m(g, g∗). g1 /∈ C as
if g1 6= g, for i ∈ S such that g(i) 6= g1(i) = ∅, g∗(i) 6= ∅, so i is not single in any stable
matching. Note that g∗ ∈ argmaxgˆ∈Eq(g′) m(g1, gˆ). As g1 /∈ C, ∃ (i,k j) : c(g1, g1 + ik j) = 0.
Case I: ∃ (i,k j): c(g1, g1 + ik j) = 0 and ik j ∈ g∗.
Let gT = g1 + ik j. Then m¯(gT, g′)≥m(gT, g∗)>m(g1, g∗) = m(g, g∗) = m¯(g, g′) and we
are done.
Case II: ∀ (i,k j): c(g1, g1 + ik j) = 0, ik j /∈ g∗.
First, we decompose the player set N into singletons who are unmatched in g1 and g∗,
pairs of players who have the same partner in g1 and g∗, and cycles defined below. Then,
we will construct a path of blockings which increase m¯(·, g∗).
For all i ∈ S: g1(i) ∈ K, g∗(i) ∈ K∗, K = K∗, we have by Lemma 5.6 that g1(i) = g∗(i).
For all i ∈ S: g1(i) ∈ K, g∗(i) ∈ K∗, K 6= K∗, either ui(g1) > ui(g∗) or ui(g∗) > ui(g1).
We assume that ui(g1) > ui(g∗). The arguments when the converse holds are identical.
Let f : N→ N be such that f (j) = g1(j) if uj(g1) > uj(g∗) and f (j) = g∗(j) otherwise.20
Suppose a sequence {i, f (i), f 2(i), f 3(i), . . .} where f 2(i) = f ( f (i)) and f k(·) for k ≥ 3 is
defined similarly. Since N is finite, the sequence must repeat and create a cycle. Denote
the cycle by a sequence (n1,n2, . . . ,nm), where n1 = i, nl = f l−1(n1), and nm is the last non-
repeated element of the cycle. In the sequence, members’ preferences alternate between
20Note that strict preferences and the definition of g∗ imply that uj(g) 6= uj(g∗) if g(j) 6= g∗(j).
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g1 and g∗, i.e. g∗(nj) = nj+1 if j is odd, and g1(nj) = nj+1 otherwise.21 Note that m is
even and that g∗(nm) = i under the assumption that ui(g1) > ui(g∗). Thus, N can be
decomposed into singletons, pairs of players and cycles in which players have different
partners in g1 and g∗.
Now, observe that @ (i,k j): c(g1, g2 = g1 + ik j) = 0, ui(g1) ≥ ui(g∗) and ukj(g1) ≥
ukj(g
∗). If there did exist such a (i,k j), then ui(g2) > ui(g1) ≥ ui(g∗) and ukj(g2) >
ukj(g1)≥ ukj(g∗), so (i,k j) would be a blocking pair for g∗ ∈ C. So, ui(g∗)> ui(g1) and/or
ukj(g
∗) > ukj(g1). Without loss of generality, let n2 be a member of a blocking pair for g1
such that un2(g
∗) > un2(g1).22 Note that g2(g1(n2)) = g2(n1) = ∅, and that unm(g∗) >
unm(g1). (n1,nm) is a blocking pair for g2. Let g3 = g2 + n1nm. m(g3, g
∗) = m(g2, g∗) + 2.
If g1(g2(n2)) 6= g∗(g2(n2)), then m(g2, g∗) = m(g1, g∗) = m(g, g∗), so m¯(g3, g′) ≥
m(g3, g∗) > m(g, g∗) = m¯(g, g∗) and we are done.
If g1(g2(n2)) = g∗(g2(n2)), then m(g2, g∗) ≥ m(g1, g∗)− 2. If m ≥ 6, then (nm−2,nm−1)
is a blocking pair for g3 as g3(nm−1) =∅, unm−2(g∗)> unm−2(g1). Let g4 = g3 + nm−1nm−2.
Then m¯(g4, g′) ≥ m(g4, g∗) = m(g3, g∗) + 2 = m(g2, g∗) + 4 > m(g1, g∗) = m(g, g∗) =
m¯(g, g′), and we are done.
For m = 4, it cannot be that un2(g2)> un2(g
∗), or (n2, g2(n2)) would be a blocking pair
for g∗. If un2(g2)< un2(g∗), then (n2,n3) is a blocking pair for g3. Let g5 = g3 + n2n3. Now
m¯(g5, g′) ≥ m(g5, g∗) = m(g3, g∗) + 2 = m(g2, g∗) + 4 > m(g1, g∗) = m(g, g∗) = m¯(g, g′),
and we are done. If un2(g2) = un2(g
∗), then n3, g2(n2) are positions in the same college.
Therefore m¯(g2, g′) = m¯(g1, g′). As m¯(g3, g′) = m¯(g2, g′) + 2, we have that m¯(g3, g′) >
m¯(g, g′), and we are done.
The proof of Lemma 5.5 above implies the following corollary. Over any two stable
states g, g∗ ∈ C such that m¯(g, g∗) = m(g, g∗), any i ∈ N such that g(i) 6= g∗(i) has prefer-
ences (over g and g∗) in opposition to the preferences of his partners in g and g∗.
Corollary A.1 Let g, g′ ∈ C. Let g∗ ∈ argmaxgˆ∈Eq(g′)m(g, gˆ). For all i ∈ N such that g(i) 6=
g∗(i), if i prefers g to g∗ (g∗ to g), then g(i) and g∗(i) prefer g∗ to g (g to g∗).
We now show lemmas analogous to Lemmas 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4. The next lemma is anal-
ogous to Lemma 3.1.
Lemma A.2 Suppose that g ∈ C and g /∈OS. If i ∈ S, k j ∈ K ∈K, (i,k j) ∈ NL(g), then g(i) 6=∅
and/or g(k j) 6=∅.
21If g1(nj) = nj+1, then nj prefers g1 to g∗, so nj+1 cannot prefer g1 to g∗, or (nj,nj+1) would block g∗. If
g∗(nj) = nj+1, then nj prefers g∗ to g1, so nj+1 cannot prefer g∗ to g1, or (nj,nj+1) ∈ g∗ would block g1.
22Such a member must be in a cycle since players who are not in cycles are indifferent between g1 and
g∗.
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Proof. Suppose g(i) = ∅ and g(k j) = ∅. Then, in any g′ ∈ C, g′(i) = ∅ and there exists
kl ∈ K such that g′(kl) =∅. As (i,k j) ∈ NL(g), g+ ik j ∈ L(g). Let g∗ ∈OS⊆ C, kl ∈ K such
that g∗(kl) = ∅. Then cL(g∗) ≤ c(g∗, g∗ + ikl) = c(g, g + ik j) = cL(g). Therefore g ∈ OS,
which contradicts our premise.
The next lemma is analogous to Lemma 3.2.
Lemma A.3 Suppose that g ∈ C, g /∈OS, and Assumption 4 holds. Suppose that (i,k j) ∈ NL(g).
Let K,K′ ∈ K be such that g(i) ∈ K and k j ∈ K′. Then, for all g∗ ∈ OS, either g∗(i) /∈ K and/or
g(k j) /∈ g∗(K′).
Proof. Let g∗ ∈OS. Suppose g∗(i)∈ K, and g(k j) = g∗(kl) for some kl ∈ K′. If K = K′, then
by Assumption 4, i= g(k j), so i= g∗(kl) and cL(g∗)≤ c(g∗, g∗− ikl) = c(g, g− ik j) = cL(g).
If K 6= K′, then cL(g∗) ≤ c(g∗, g∗ + ikl) = c(g, g + ik j) = cL(g). Therefore g ∈ OS, which
contradicts our premise.
Lemma A.4 (Getting Closer Lemma II) Suppose the dynamic satisfies Assumptions 4, 5 . Let
g′ ∈ OS. Suppose that g ∈ C and g /∈ OS. Let g1 ∈ L(g). Then, ∃ g′′ ∈ C, t ∈N+, such that
m¯(g′, g′′) > m¯(g′, g) and Pt0(g1, g
′′) > 0.
Proof. Let g∗ satisfy:
g∗ ∈ argmax
gˆ∈Eq(g′)
m(g, gˆ)
and
g∗ ∈ argmax
gˆ∈Eq(g′)
m(g1, gˆ).
It is possible to choose such a g∗ as any student matched to the same college in g and g1
is matched to the same position of that college.
Suppose that g− ig(i) ∈ L(g). Suppose that i ∈ S. Let g(i) ∈ K and g∗(i) ∈ K∗. Under
Assumption 5, g′ ∈ OS implies g∗ ∈ OS. This, and g /∈ OS imply g(i) ∈ K 6= K∗ 3 g∗(i),
so m(g∗, g1) = m(g∗, g), and as m¯(g′, g1) = m(g∗, g1) and m¯(g′, g) = m(g∗, g), we have
m¯(g′, g1) = m¯(g′, g). Since g1 is unstable (i is single), Lemma 5.5 guarantees there exists
T ∈N+, gT ∈ G, such that PT0 (g1, gT) > 0 and m¯(g′, gT) > m¯(g′, g1) = m¯(g′, g).
Next, suppose that g + ik j ∈ L(g). If g(i) 6= ∅, let K be such that g(i) ∈ K and K∗ be
such that g∗(i) ∈ K∗. Let k j ∈ Kj. Lemma A.3 implies that (g(i) 6=∅ and K 6= K∗) and/or
(∅ 6= g(k j) /∈ g∗(Kj)). Furthermore, Lemma A.2 implies that g(i) 6=∅ and/or g(k j) 6=∅.
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Case I: (g(i) 6=∅, K 6= K∗ and ∅ 6= g(k j) /∈ g∗(Kj)) and/or (ik j ∈ g∗).
Note that m¯(g′, g1) = m(g∗, g1)≥ m(g∗, g) = m¯(g′, g), with the inequality strict if ik j ∈
g∗. If ik j /∈ g∗, since g1 is unstable (g(k j) is single), Lemma 5.5 implies that there exists
T ∈N+, gT ∈ G, such that PT0 (g1, gT) > 0 and m¯(g′, gT) > m¯(g′, g1) = m¯(g′, g).
Case II: (g(i) 6=∅, K 6= K∗ and (∅ 6= g(k j) ∈ g∗(Kj) or g(k j) =∅)) and (ik j /∈ g∗).
By definition of g∗, it must be that g(k j) = g∗(k j). Note that m(g∗, g1) ≥ m(g∗, g)− 2
as g1(k j) 6= g(k j) = g∗(k j).
If g∗(g(i)) =∅, then g(K) = g∗(K)23, so g∗(i) ∈ K and we have a contradiction. There-
fore g∗(g(i)) 6=∅.
First, suppose that g∗(g(i)) is indifferent between g and g∗. This implies g(g∗(g(i)))
and g∗(g∗(g(i))) = g(i) are positions in the same college. By definition of g∗ and lemma
5.6 we have g(g∗(g(i))) = g∗(g∗(g(i))) = g(i). So g∗(g(i)) = i, implying in turn that
g(i) = g∗(i) and K = K∗ which is a contradiction. Therefore g∗(g(i)) is not indifferent
between g and g∗.
Second, suppose that g∗(g(i)) prefers g∗ to g. Let g2 = g1 + g(i)g∗(g(i)). Recall that
g(i) is single, that g∗(g(i)) is either single or indifferent between g and g1, and that As-
sumption 4 does not prevent g(i) and g∗(g(i)) from being matched, so P0(g1, g2) > 0.
Note that m¯(g′, g2)≥m(g∗, g2)≥m(g∗, g) = m¯(g′, g). It cannot be that g∗(g(i)) = g(k j) as
by g(k j) = g∗(k j)we then have that g∗(g(i)) = g∗(k j)which would imply g(i) = k j, contra-
dicting g+ ik j ∈ L(g). If g(k j) 6=∅, g2 is unstable because g(k j) is single. If g(k j) =∅, then
for all g˜ ∈ C, g˜(Kj) = g(Kj), so g(i) /∈ Kj implies ik j is not in any stable matching and g2
is unstable. Lemma 5.5 implies that there exists T ∈N+, gT ∈ G, such that PT0 (g2, gT) > 0
and m¯(g′, gT) > m¯(g′, g2) ≥ m¯(g′, g).
Third, suppose that g∗(g(i)) prefers g to g∗. Corollary A.1 implies that g(i) prefers g∗
to g, and that i prefers g to g∗, and that g∗(i) prefers g∗ to g.24 If k j prefers g∗ to g1 and
g∗(k j) 6= ∅, then let k j and g∗(k j) get matched.25 If g∗(k j) = ∅, let k j leave i to become a
singleton. Let the resulting network be g3. Note that m¯(g′, g3) ≥ m(g∗, g3) ≥ m(g∗, g) =
m¯(g′, g). Since g3 is unstable (i is single), Lemma 5.5 implies that there exists T ∈N+,
gT ∈ G, such that PT0 (g3, gT) > 0 and m¯(g′, gT) > m¯(g′, g3) ≥ m¯(g′, g). If k j prefers g1 to
23Roth (1986) tells us that any college with unfilled places in some stable matching is matched to the
same set of students in any stable matching. A corollary of this is that any college must be matched to the
same number of students in any stable matching.
24They strictly do so. g(i) and g∗(i) are college positions and have strict preferences over students.
K 6= K∗ implies that student i has strict preferences over g and g∗.
25If g(k j) 6= ∅ then g∗(k j) is single in g1 because g(k j) = g∗(k j). Assumption 4 does not prevent k j and
g∗(k j) from being matched.
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g∗, then i prefers g∗ to g1.26 g∗(i) 6= k j, so g1(g∗(i)) = g(g∗(i)) and g∗(i) does not prefer
g1 to g. Therefore g∗(i) prefers g∗ to g1. Let i and g∗(i) get matched. Let g4 denote the
resulting network. Note that m¯(g′, g4) ≥ m(g∗, g4) ≥ m(g∗, g) = m¯(g′, g). g(i) is single
and g∗(i) /∈ K, so |g4(K)| < |g(K)| and g4 is unstable. Lemma 5.5 implies that there exists
T ∈N+, gT ∈ G, such that PT0 (g4, gT) > 0 and m¯(g′, gT) > m¯(g′, g4) ≥ m¯(g′, g).
Case III: (g(i) =∅ or g(i) 6=∅, K = K∗) and (∅ 6= g(k j) /∈ g∗(Kj)) and (ik j /∈ g∗).
Note that m(g∗, g1) ≥ m(g∗, g)− 2 as g(k j) /∈ g∗(Kj). First, suppose that i prefers g to
g1. If g(i) 6= ∅, let i and g(i) get matched. If g(i) = ∅, let i leave k j to be single. Let g5
denote the resulting network. g(i) ∈ K = K∗ or g(i) = g∗(i) = ∅ implies that m¯(g′, g5) ≥
m(g∗, g5) ≥ m(g∗, g) = m¯(g′, g). Since g5 is unstable (g(k j) is single), Lemma 5.5 implies
that m¯(g′, gT) > m¯(g′, g5) ≥ m¯(g′, g) with PT0 (g5, gT) > 0 for some T ∈N+, gT ∈ G.
Next, suppose that i prefers g1 to g. Then k j prefers g and g∗ to g1. If k j prefers g∗
to g, then g(k j) prefers g to g∗. This implies that g∗(g(k j)) prefers g∗ to g. Let g∗(g(k j))
and g(k j) get matched. Let g6 denote the resulting network. If g(g∗(g(k j))) = ∅, then
by definition of g∗ and Roth (1986) we have g∗(g∗(g(k j))) = g(k j) =∅, contradicting our
assumptions for Case III. If g(g∗(g(k j))) 6= ∅, then g(g∗(g(k j))) is single in g6, so g6 is
unstable. Lemma 5.5 implies that m¯(g′, gT) > m¯(g′, g6) ≥ m¯(g′, g) with PT0 (g6, gT) > 0 for
some T ∈N+, gT ∈ G.
If k j prefers g to g∗, then g∗(k j) prefers g∗ to g. Let k j and g∗(k j) get matched. Let g7
denote the resulting network. Note that m¯(g′, g7)≥m(g∗, g7)≥m(g∗, g) = m¯(g′, g). Since
g7 is unstable (g(k j) is single), Lemma 5.5 implies that m¯(g′, gT)> m¯(g′, g7)≥ m¯(g′, g)with
PT0 (g7, gT) > 0 for some T ∈N+, gT ∈ G.
For all cases, we have shown that there exists T ∈N+, gT ∈ G, such that PT0 (g1, gT)> 0
and m¯(g′, gT) > m¯(g′, g). If gT ∈ C, then we are done by letting gT = g′′. If gT /∈ C, then
repeated application of Lemma 5.5 will lead the process to g′′ ∈ C such that m¯(g′, g′′) >
m¯(g′, g).
Proof of Theorem 5.8. If g ∈ SS, then g ∈ C and there exists a minimal cost spanning
tree rooted at g. Denote the cost of this tree by cost(g). Assume g /∈ OS. Choose g′ ∈OS.
Construct a path of edges (g = g1, . . . , gL) such that gi ∈ C, gi /∈ OS for i = 1, . . . , L − 1,
and gL ∈ OS. The path is constructed as follows. For each gi, i = 1, . . . , L− 1, Lemma A.4
26i strictly dose so. ik j /∈ g∗ and the definition of g∗ imply that i is matched to different colleges in g1
and g∗.
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implies:
∃ gi+1 ∈ C : m¯(g′, gi+1) > m¯(g′, gi) and C(gi, gi+1) = cL(gi).
This is repeated until we reach some gL ∈OS. Add these edges to the conjectured minimal
cost spanning tree, replacing the existing edges exiting g2, . . . , gL−1. Remove the edge
leaving gL. Denote the cost of the new tree by cost(gL). Then:
cost(gL) ≤ cost(g) + cL(g)− cL(gL) < cost(g).
The first inequality follows from the construction of the tree rooted at gL; the second
inequality holds as g /∈OS implies cL(g)< cL(gL). So, the conjectured minimal cost span-
ning tree can have been no such thing. Contradiction.
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